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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-4488

FORESTAL GUARANI S.A.,
Appellant
v.
DAROS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-03-cv-04821)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 16, 2010
Before: FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges,
and PRATTER,* District Judge.
(Filed: July 21, 2010)

*

Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.

Eugene M. Banta, Jr.
322 East 86th Street
New York, NY 10028
Counsel for Appellant

OPINION OF THE COURT

FISHER, Circuit Judge.
At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods as it relates to a contract dispute between two
corporations, one based in the United States and the other in
Argentina. The Convention contains a provision allowing a
contract to be proved even if it is not in writing but also
authorizes a signatory state to make a declaration opting out of
that and related provisions. The United States has not made
such a declaration; Argentina has. The District Court concluded
that Argentina’s declaration imposed a writing requirement and
that the absence of a written contract in this case precluded the
plaintiff’s claim. We disagree with that approach. We conclude
that where, as here, one party’s country of incorporation has
made a declaration while the other’s has not, a court must first
decide, based on the forum state’s choice-of-law rules, which
forum’s law applies, and then apply the law of the forum
designated by the choice-of-law analysis.

2

We cannot decide on this record whether New Jersey or
Argentine law applies here. Furthermore, because the parties
have not briefed the issue and the District Court did not address
it, we are reluctant to determine whether the claim asserted here
would survive under either jurisdiction’s laws. Accordingly, we
will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for
the defendant and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Forestal Guarani S.A.1 is an Argentina-based
manufacturer of various lumber products, including wooden
finger-joints.2 Daros International, Inc., is a New Jersey-based
import-export corporation. In 1999, Forestal and Daros entered
into an oral agreement whereby Daros agreed to sell Forestal’s
wooden finger-joints to third parties in the United States.
Pursuant to that agreement, Forestal sent Daros finger-joints
worth $1,857,766.06.
Daros paid Forestal a total of
$1,458,212.35. Forestal demanded the balance due but Daros
declined to pay. In April 2002, Forestal sued Daros in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, asserting a breach-of-contract

1

The first word in the appellant’s name is variably spelled
in the record as “Forestal” and “Forrestal.” For the sake of
consistency, we adopt the former spelling.
2

Because this is an appeal from the grant of summary
judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to
Forestal, the nonmoving party. See Fagan v. City of Vineland,
22 F.3d 1296, 1299 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
3

claim based on Daros’ refusal to pay. Daros thereafter removed
the case to the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. In its answer, Daros admitted that it had paid
Forestal $1,458,212.35 in exchange for the finger-joints but
denied that it owed Forestal any additional money. Discovery
ensued.
In June 2005, Daros moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the parties lacked a written agreement in violation
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No.
98-9 (1983), 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980), reprinted at 15 U.S.C. App.
(1998) (“CISG”), and that Forestal could not otherwise
substantiate its damages claim with credible evidence. The
District Court summarily denied the motion, concluding that
genuine questions of material fact existed. The Court later held
a conference with the parties and ordered briefing on several
specific questions regarding the applicability of the CISG. Both
parties complied and agreed that the CISG governed Forestal’s
claim. In October 2008, the District Court granted Daros’
summary judgment motion, concluding that the CISG governed
the parties’ dispute and barred Forestal’s claim because the
parties’ agreement was not in writing. The Court also found that
Forestal had not adduced any other evidence of its alleged
agreement with Daros. Forestal has timely appealed the District
Court’s ruling.3

3

After this appeal was docketed, Daros’ counsel moved
to withdraw from its representation of Daros. The Clerk of this
Court granted that motion. Daros has not obtained new counsel
4

II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review of the District Court’s denial of summary judgment is
plenary. Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd.
of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009). We apply the same
test the District Court should have used. Oritani Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d
Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
III.
The parties do not dispute that the CISG governs their
dispute. While Daros does not deny that it had a contract with
Forestal, the thrust of Daros’ argument is that the parties do not
have a written contract and that, under the CISG, the absence of
a writing precludes Forestal’s claim. While conceding that the
CISG applies generally, Forestal contests the District Court’s
ruling on the ground that the lack of a writing, in its view, is
inconsequential in light of the parties’ course of dealing, as
evidenced by Forestal’s delivery of finger-joints to Daros and

and has not submitted an appellate brief. Its former counsel has
indicated that Daros rests on its filings with the District Court to
support its position in this appeal.
5

Daros’ remittance of payments to Forestal, as well as an
accountant’s report and invoices Forestal claims show that
Daros owes it money.
The CISG “applies to contracts of sale of goods between
parties whose places of business are in different States . . . when
the States are Contracting States[.]” 15 U.S.C. App., Art.
1(1)(a); see Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333
F.3d 440, 444 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003). The United States ratified the
CISG on December 11, 1986, Argentina ratified it on July 19,
1983, and it became effective in both countries on January 1,
1988. John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales
Under the 1980 United Nations Convention 693-94 (2d ed.
1991). Because both the United States, where Daros is based,
and Argentina, where Forestal is based, are signatories to the
CISG and the alleged contract at issue involves the sale of
goods, we agree with the parties that the CISG governs
Forestal’s claim.4 See, e.g., Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A.
v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 2002).
To resolve the parties’ dispute, we turn to the text of the CISG
itself, see, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1983,
1990 (2010) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the
interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” (quoting
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008)); see also Chicago
Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d
894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp.,
71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995), giving effect to its plain

4

The CISG lists several exceptions to its applicability,
none of which is relevant here. See 15 U.S.C. App., Art. 2.
6

language “absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence,”
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982).5
“The CISG strives to promote certainty among
contracting parties and simplicity in judicial understanding by
(1) reducing forum shopping, (2) reducing the need to resort to
rules of private international law, and (3) establishing a law of
sales appropriate for international transactions.” A. E. Butler,
A Practical Guide to the CISG: Negotiations through Litigation
§ 1.08, at 1-15 (2007 Supp.) (footnote omitted). These goals are
explicitly enshrined in the CISG. Article 7 directs a court, in
interpreting the CISG, to be mindful of “its international
character and . . . the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.” 15 U.S.C. App., Art. 7(1). In furtherance of these
principles, as relevant here, the CISG dispenses with certain
formalities associated with proving the existence of a contract.

5

The CISG vests private parties with a private right of
action. BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de
Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Delchi
Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1027-28). As a treaty to which the United
States is a signatory, the CISG, as opposed to state law,
ordinarily controls. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; see also David
Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia
of Habit, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 495, 503-04 (1999). As we shall see,
however, that default rule gives way under certain
circumstances.
7

Specifically, Article 11 instructs that “[a] contract of sale need
not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject
to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any
means, including witnesses.” Id., Art. 11. Similarly, Article 29
permits a contract modification to be proved even if it is not in
writing. Id., Art. 29. And Part II of the CISG, titled “Formation
of the Contract,” outlines requirements governing offer and
acceptance but does not impose a writing requirement.
Article 11’s elimination of formal writing requirements
does not apply in all instances in which the CISG governs.
Article 96 of the CISG carves out an exception to Article 11,
Article 29 and Part II. It says that
[a] Contracting State whose legislation requires
contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced
by writing may at any time make a declaration in
accordance with article 12 that any provision of
article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention,
that allows a contract of sale or its modification or
termination by agreement or any offer,
acceptance, or other indication of intention to be
made in any form other than in writing, does not
apply where any party has his place of business in
that State.
Id., Art. 96.
Article 12, to which Article 96 refers, states that

8

[a]ny provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II
of this Convention that allows a contract of sale
. . . to be made in any form other than in writing
does not apply where any party has his place of
business in a Contracting State which has made a
declaration under article 96 of this Convention.
The parties may not derogate from or vary the
effect of this article.
Id., Art. 12.
The United States has not made an Article 96 declaration,
so Article 11 governs contract formation in cases involving a
United States-based litigant and a litigant based in another nondeclaring signatory state. Argentina, however, has made a
declaration under Article 96, thereby opting out of Article 11,
Article 29 and Part II.6

6

Argentina’s declaration reads as follows:

In accordance with Articles 96 and 12 of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, any provisions of
[A]rticle 11, Article 29 or Part II of the
Convention that allows a contract of sale . . . to be
made in any form other than in writing does not
apply where any party has his place of business in
the Argentine Republic.
15 U.S.C. App. at 390 n.1.
9

Our research has turned up almost no case law from
courts in the United States informing how to address a case,
such as this one, in which one state has made an Article 96
declaration and the other has not.7
Courts in foreign
jurisdictions and commentators alike are divided over how to
proceed in such a scenario. See UNCITRAL Digest of Case
Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods 46, 48 (2008) (outlining the conflict). According to
one school of thought, a court must at the outset conduct a
choice-of-law analysis based on private international law
principles to determine which state’s law governs contract
formation, and then apply that law to a party’s claim. See, e.g.,
Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not
Resolved by the CISG, 20 J.L. & Com. 155, 167 (2001) (citing
various commentators and a decision by a Hungarian court).
Our study of the available sources on the subject establishes this
position as the clear majority view.8 In contrast, under what

7

The only decision from a court in the United States
directly on point that we have unearthed is by a magistrate judge
in the Southern District of Florida. See Zhejiang Shaoxing
Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co. v. Microflock Textile Group
Corp., No. 06-22608, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40418 (S.D. Fla.
May 19, 2008). The District Court in this case relied on
Zhejiang to support its conclusion.
8

See 15 U.S.C. App. at 372 (reproducing an August 30,
1983, letter from the Secretary of State to the President
accompanied by a Department of State legal analysis supporting
the choice-of-law approach); C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell,
10

appears to be the minority view, a court should simply require
the existence of a writing without reference to either state’s law,
though it is unclear what form such a writing would have to take
to be considered sufficient. See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca,
Implementation of Contract Formation Statute of Frauds, Parol
Evidence, and Battle of Forms CISG Provisions in Civil and

Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna
Sales Convention 126-27 (1987); Franco Ferrari, Writing
Requirements: Article 11-13, in The Draft UNCITRAL Digest
and Beyond: Cases, Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the U.N.
Sales Convention 213-14 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2005); John
O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the
1980 United Nations Convention 186-91 (4th ed. 2009); Albert
H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods 143 (1989); Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG:
A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 174-75 (3d ed.
2008); Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Commentary
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) 169-70 (2d ed. 2005); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several
Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on
Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & Com. 187, 19697 (1998); Mather, 20 J.L. & Com. at 166-67 (describing this
position as the “prevailing view”); Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The
Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of
Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus.
299, 323-24, 327-28 (2004).
11

Common Law Countries, 25 J.L. & Com. 133, 138-39 (2005)
(citing decisions by courts in Russia and Belgium).9

9

Without saying so explicitly, the District Court here
adopted the minority view, reasoning that where, as here, a
country has opted out of Article 11 a contract must be in writing
and that because Forestal had not produced a writing, its claim
failed as a matter of law. In a footnote, the Court noted
alternatively that a choice-of-law analysis would produce the
same result, explaining that New Jersey’s statute of frauds
imposes a writing requirement and that Argentina’s decision
itself to opt out of Article 11 signified that country’s writing
requirement. The District Court did not conduct a choice-of-law
analysis and did not explicitly consider the respective form
requirements, or exceptions to those requirements, of either New
Jersey or Argentine law. Instead, the District Court evidently
presumed that a country’s Article 96 declaration automatically
translates into a requirement that a contract be in writing. But,
as we explain below, the CISG does not say as much. It says
only that its freedom-from-form requirements do not apply
where a country has made an Article 96 declaration. Indeed, if
the District Court’s approach were correct, courts would have a
hard time determining what precisely constitutes an adequate
“writing” under these circumstances. Is it a professionally
drafted document with paragraph symbols, signed and dated by
both parties? Is it a scribbling on the back of a napkin? Where,
as here, an Article 96 declaration makes Articles 11 and 29 and
Part II of the CISG inapplicable, the CISG is silent on this point.
12

Although none of the supporters of what we perceive as
the majority view have explained their reasoning in any detail,
we conclude that the majority has it right. Our conclusion is
compelled by the CISG’s plain language. Cf. Maximov v.
United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (interpreting a treaty
according to its plain language); Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S.
317, 331-32 (1912) (similar). The CISG says that “[q]uestions
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law [i.e. choice of law].” 15
U.S.C. App., Art. 7(2). Because Argentina has opted out of
Articles 11 and 29 as well as Part II of the CISG, the CISG does
not “expressly settle” the question whether a breach-of-contract
claim is sustainable in the absence of a written contract. So
Article 7(2) tells us to consider the CISG’s “general principles”
to fill in the gap. We have already outlined some of the general
principles undergirding the CISG, but we fail to see how they
inform the question whether Forestal’s contract claim may
proceed. Indeed, given the inapplicability in this case of any of
the CISG’s provisions relaxing or eliminating writing
requirements, we do not believe that we can answer the question
presented here based on a pure application of those principles
alone. Given that neither the CISG nor its founding principles
explicitly or implicitly settle our inquiry, Article 7(2)’s reference
to “the rules of private international law” is triggered. In other
words, we have to consider the choice-of-law rules of the forum
state, in this case New Jersey, to determine whether New Jersey
or Argentine form requirements govern Forestal’s claim. See,

13

e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231
(1996).10
In making a choice-of-law determination in a breach-ofcontract case, New Jersey courts ask which forum has the most
significant relationship with the parties and the contract. See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d
488, 491-92 (N.J. 1980); Keil v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 710
A.2d 563, 569-70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). To that end,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the principles set

10

Although the CISG’s plain language obviates the need
for resort to its drafting history, we note nonetheless that that
history buttresses our conclusion. As one commentator has
written,
the sole fact that one party has its place of
business in a State that made an Article 96
reservation does not necessarily make applicable
the form requirements of that State. . . . Rather,
the rules of private international [law] of the
forum should dictate whether any form
requirements have to be met. The legislative
history of the Convention appears to corroborate
this view, since at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic
Conference a proposal was rejected pursuant to
which the form requirements of a State that had
made an Article 96 reservation had to be applied.
Ferrari, supra, at 213 (footnotes omitted).
14

forth in § 188 and § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Laws. See Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co.,
629 A.2d 885, 888 (N.J. 1993). Section 188 directs courts to
consider, among other things:
(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of
negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter
of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 188(2) (1971).
Section 6 lists the following nonexclusive factors
relevant to a choice-of-law analysis:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result, and (g) ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6(2).

15

We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by
a district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider
them in the first instance. See, e.g., In re Montgomery Ward &
Co., 428 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); Montrose Med. Group
Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 778 (3d Cir.
2001). This case bolsters the rationale behind our reluctance to
wade into matters that the parties have not joined and that a
district court has not addressed, as the record here sheds
practically no light on many, if not most, of the choice-of-law
considerations listed above.
It is true that we can affirm a district court’s ruling on
any ground supported by the record. See Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 256 n.12 (3d Cir. 2010).
There is no dispute here that Forestal’s contract with Daros was
verbal at best, so we could feasibly skip a choice-of-law analysis
and apply both New Jersey and Argentine law to Forestal’s
claim to test its viability. New Jersey’s statute of frauds
provides that “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
$500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought . . . .” N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 12A:2-201(1). While Forestal’s claim might fail under that
provision, the statute also makes several exceptions to the
general rule. See id. § 12A:2-201(3). The parties have not
briefed, and the record in this case prevents us from concluding
definitively, whether any such exception is applicable here. As
for Argentine law, we may safely assume that it requires some
sort of writing, as Article 96 of the CISG permits a country to
opt out of Article 11 only if its domestic law “requires contracts
16

of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing . . . .” 15
U.S.C. App., Art. 96. We have looked at the Argentine Civil
Code; it contains several provisions governing contract
formation and ways of proving a contract. Forestal’s offer of
proof may or may not suffice under those provisions. In the end,
we think it unwise either to venture into this choice-of-law
thicket – the outcome of which is determinative of this case – or
to engage in a largely speculative exercise about the viability of
Forestal’s claim under either jurisdiction’s law without the
benefit of either any briefing whatsoever by the parties or any
analysis by the District Court on this point. Because these issues
deserve a full airing, we conclude that remand is a better course
of action.
Our conclusion that remand is appropriate is also driven
by the posture in which this case reaches us. Forestal is
appealing from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
for Daros on Daros’ motion. In other words, although it did not
say so explicitly, the District Court determined that Daros had
met its initial burden of showing that there remained no genuine
questions of material fact and that Daros was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. As we read Daros’ moving papers,
we understand Daros to have sought to meet that burden by
advancing two main arguments. First, Daros argued that
summary judgment was proper because, in its view, the CISG
requires a writing in light of Argentina’s Article 96 declaration
and Forestal did not produce a formal written contract. We have
concluded, however, that such a position is wrong as a matter of
law. As we have explained, the resolution of this case requires
a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether New Jersey or
Argentine form requirements govern as well as an inquiry into
17

whether Forestal’s offer of proof is adequate under whichever
forum’s law that analysis designates. In other words, Daros
could not have met its initial summary judgment burden of
showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law when
there was, in effect, no law to apply.
Second, Daros contended that Forestal had submitted no
“credible evidence” of a contract with Daros. The District Court
agreed with that contention, concluding that there was no
evidence that the parties ever had any contract at all. It is
undisputed, however, that Forestal sold wooden finger-joints to
Daros and that Daros gave Forestal money in exchange. Indeed,
Daros nowhere denies that the parties at the very least had a
verbal contract for those sales. Furthermore, Forestal submitted
an accountant’s certification, with supporting documentation, as
well as invoices in an effort to substantiate its claim that it is
owed money. There is also deposition testimony indicating that
the parties had a contract. The District Court did not expressly
refer to some of these materials in its opinion, and we do not
know why it evidently disregarded them. The Court also
rejected Forestal’s reliance on the invoices Forestal submitted,
but did so based on New Jersey law alone – that is, with no
parallel analysis under Argentine law – without explaining its
reference to that state’s law when the Court had already decided
that the CISG controlled this case. In short, we cannot say at
this stage that there is no genuine question of material fact as to
whether the parties had or did not have some sort of contractual
relationship and whether Forestal can prove as much under
whatever law actually controls this case. As a consequence, we

18

are not persuaded that Daros met its initial summary judgment
burden on the record as it now stands.11
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment for Daros and remand for
further proceedings. On remand, the District Court may
determine, based on New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules, whether
New Jersey or Argentine law governs and then apply that
forum’s law to this case. Our disposition does not suggest that
a trial is necessarily warranted. Summary judgment, or some
other pretrial disposition, including a venue transfer, may be
appropriate on a more developed record.

11

Our dissenting colleague does not believe that we
should remand this case for a choice-of-law analysis. He would
hold that Forestal waived its right to pursue such an analysis by
failing to press it in the District Court. To be sure, as we have
noted, the parties did not address this issue in the District Court
and that court did not reach it. The dissent overlooks, however,
that the waiver doctrine is founded on equitable principles and
that its enforcement is within our discretion. We think it would
be particularly unfair to apply it against a party whose adversary
elected not even to participate in this appeal. Moreover, as we
have also pointed out, the District Court did not reach this issue
in error; that omission does not bar us from considering it.
19

COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting
I believe that the issues addressed at some length by the
Court have not been properly preserved for appellate
consideration. With respect to the merits, I have serious doubts
as to the validity of the approach actually adopted by the
majority. I therefore must respectfully dissent.
It is well established that this Court generally refuses to
consider an argument or issue that a party has failed to raise in
the District Court. See, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist.,
— F.3d —, 2010 WL 2038871, at *11 (3d Cir. May 25, 2010)
(finding that due process claim was never asserted in district
court and refusing to address merits of constitutional argument
raised for first time on appeal); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that, in
absence of exceptional circumstances, we will not consider
issues raised for first time on appeal and explaining that party
must present argument at appropriate time and with sufficient
specificity); In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“We need not address the merits of Surrick’s third and final
argument – that the state court’s ruling violates his First
Amendment rights and therefore constitutes a grave injustice
pursuant to RAC II(D) – as he failed to adequately raise it
before the District Court.” (citing Brenner v. Local 514, United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d
Cir. 1991))). Similarly, we usually refrain from addressing an
argument or issue not properly raised and discussed in the
appellate briefing. See, e.g., Surrick, 338 F.3d at 237 (“Further,
to the extent that Surrick’s reply brief may be read to challenge
the District Court’s finding of waiver with respect to the First
Amendment argument that was asserted below, we conclude
that his failure to identify or argue this issue in his opening brief
constitutes waiver of this argument on appeal.” (citing Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993))).
Both before the District Court and now on appeal,
Forrestal has failed to raise the various issues resolved by the
majority. Specifically, it has failed to raise the issue of whether,
in cases where one party’s country of incorporation has made an
Article 96 declaration under the CISG while the country of the

other party to the alleged contract has not done so, a court must
initially decide, based on the forum’s choice-of-law rules,
which country’s law applies and then apply the substantive law
of the applicable jurisdiction. Likewise, the parties have not
briefed the specific question of whether New Jersey or
Argentine law applies here. The majority itself acknowledges
that the District Court did not conduct a choice-of-law analysis
and did not explicitly consider any form requirements, or any
exceptions to those requirements, recognized under either New
Jersey or Argentine law. In a letter dated May 7, 2010, this
Court even went so far as to direct Forrestal’s counsel to
respond to the following two questions:
1. Is it your contention that a choice of
law analysis must be conducted under New Jersey
law (as the law of the forum state) in order to
decide whether the contract laws of Argentina or
the contract laws of New Jersey govern here? If
so, please explain in detail why such an analysis
was required? And please explain where you
raised and preserved this contention below?
2. Is it your contention that the contract
law of Argentina would provide you with a legal
claim even in the absence of a written contract?
If so, why? Also please explain where you raised
and preserved this contention below?
Through its counsel, Forrestal eventually submitted a document
that I believe is, at best, non-responsive to our letter and
ultimately unhelpful.
I believe that it would be inappropriate for this Court to
consider these CISG and choice-of-law issues at this juncture.
In fact, the complexity and outright novelty of the CISG issue
clearly weigh in favor of following our usual approach to nonpreserved arguments and issues. The majority itself notes that
it has uncovered almost no case law indicating how we should
address the situation in which one state has made an Article 96
declaration under the CISG (i.e., Argentina) and the other state
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has not made an equivalent declaration (i.e., the United States).
In turn, it further observes that courts in other countries as well
as various commentators are divided over how to proceed in
such circumstances and that even the supporters of the position
ultimately adopted in the majority opinion have not explained
their own reasoning in any real detail. We should be especially
reluctant to address a totally novel yet important issue of
international law where we do not have the benefit of full and
proper briefing by the parties.
Finally, considering arguendo the merits of these issues
(which the Court should not), I would still have considerable
difficulty agreeing with the majority’s holding that a choice-oflaw analysis is required here because such an approach appears
to be at odds with the CISG itself. I acknowledge that the
majority has clearly given this novel question a great deal of
attention and has thoroughly, fairly, and competently explained
its own reasoning. However, it still appears that, given the plain
language of this international treaty, its structure, and its
purposes, a written contract is required where, as here, one of
the relevant countries has exercised its right to make an Article
96 declaration. In turn, because Forrestal has clearly failed to
produce the requisite written agreement, its contractual claim
must accordingly fail as a matter of law. Nevertheless, I
reiterate that we should not reach the merits of this complicated
issue at this time.
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